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10 - Attribute-Task Compatibility as a Determinant of Consumer Preference Reversals
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- By Stephen M. Nowlis, Research Professor of Marketing, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Itamar Simonson, Professor of Marketing, Stanford Graduate School of Business
- Edited by Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic
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- Book:
- The Construction of Preference
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 28 August 2006, pp 192-219
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Summary
Consumer preferences can be formed in different ways. In some cases, buyers directly compare alternatives across various attributes and choose the one they most prefer. In other situations, consumers evaluate each option separately and then pick the one that is judged most favorably. It has traditionally been assumed in marketing and decision research that preferences are invariant across such preference formation and elicitation methods (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). For example, the proportion of consumers who indicate (in a rating task) a higher purchase likelihood for Brand A than for Brand B is expected to be similar to the proportion of consumers who prefer Brand A over B in a choice task. Accordingly, marketing researchers have employed a variety of techniques for assessing and predicting consumer preferences, such as choice, rating, ranking, and matching (e.g., Urban & Hauser, 1993).
A question that naturally arises is whether alternative preference elicitation tasks generate the same preferences or whether they lead to systematically different preferences or “preference reversals.” Tversky et al. (1988) demonstrate a systematic discrepancy between choice and value-matching whereby an alternative that is superior on the more prominent dimension (and significantly inferior on a second dimension) is more likely to be preferred in choice. Prior research also examines the differences between judgment and choice (e.g., Billings & Scherer, 1988; Ganzach, 1995; Montgomery, Selart, Gärling, & Lindberg, 1994; Payne, 1982) as well as between attribute- and attitude-based preferences (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Gibson, 1991).
22 - Reason-Based Choice
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- By Eldar Shafir, Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs, Princeton University, Itamar Simonson, Sebastian S. Kresge Professor of Marketing, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Amos Tversky, Davis Brack Professor of Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University
- Edited by Sarah Lichtenstein, Paul Slovic
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- Book:
- The Construction of Preference
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 28 August 2006, pp 411-433
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Summary
The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecision. Fortunately it is too familiar to need description, for to describe it would be impossible. As long as it lasts, with the various objects before the attention, we are said to deliberate; and when finally the original suggestion either prevails and makes the movement take place, or gets definitively quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide … in favor of one or the other course. The reinforcing and inhibiting ideas meanwhile are termed the reasons or motives by which the decision is brought about.
– William James (1890/1981)My way is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the one Pro, and over the other Con. Then, during three or four days' consideration, I put down under the different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different times occur to me for or against the measure. When I have thus got them all together in one view, I endeavor to estimate the respective weights … find at length where the balance lies…. And, though the weight of reasons cannot be taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet, when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole matter lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash step; and in fact I have found great advantage for this kind of equation, in what may be called moral or prudential algebra.
– Benjamin Franklin, 1772 (cited by Bigelow, 1887)
29 - Context-Dependent Preferences
- from PART SIX - THE MULTIPLICITY OF VALUE: REVERSALS OF PREFERENCE
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- By Amos Tversky, Stanford University, Itamar Simonson, Stanford University
- Edited by Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University, New Jersey, Amos Tversky, Stanford University, California
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- Book:
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Published online:
- 01 February 2019
- Print publication:
- 25 September 2000, pp 518-527
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ABSTRACT. The standard theory of choice -based on value maximization-associates with each option a real value such that, given an offered set, the decision maker chooses the option with the highest value. Despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, there is a growing body of data that is inconsistent with this theory. In particular, the relative attractiveness of x compared to y often depends on the presence or absence of a third option z, and the “market share” of an option can actually be increased by enlarging the offered set. We review recent empirical findings that are inconsistent with value maximization and present a context-dependent model that expresses the value of each option as an additive combination of two components: a contingent weighting process that captures the effect of the background context, and a binary comparison process that describes the effect of the local context. The model accounts for observed violations of the standard theory and provides a framework for analyzing context-dependent preferences.
KEY WORDS decision making; consumer choice; independence of irrelevant alternatives
The theory of rational choice assumes that preference between options does not depend on the presence or absence of other options. This principle, called independence of irrelevant alternatives, is essentially equivalent to the assumption that the decision maker has a complete preference order of all options, and that -given an offered set - the decision maker always selects the option that is highest in that order. Despite its simplicity and intuitive appeal, experimental evidence indicates that this principle is often violated (see Huber et al. 1982, Simonson and Tversky 1992).
34 - Reason-Based Choice
- from PART EIGHT - ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF VALUE
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- By Eldar Shafir, Princeton University, Itamar Simonson, Stanford University, Amos Tversky, Stanford University
- Edited by Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University, New Jersey, Amos Tversky, Stanford University, California
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- Book:
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Published online:
- 01 February 2019
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- 25 September 2000, pp 597-619
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ABSTRACT. This paper considers the role of reasons and arguments in the making of decisions. It is proposed that, when faced with the need to choose, decision makers often seek and construct reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choice, to themselves and to others. Experiments that explore and manipulate the role of reasons are reviewed, and other decision studies are interpreted from this perspective. The role of reasons in decision making is considered as it relates to uncertainty, conflict, context effects, and normative decision rules.
The result is that peculiar feeling of inward unrest known as indecision. Fortunately it is too familiar to need description, for to describe it would be impossible. As long as it lasts, with the various objects before the attention, we are said to deliberate; and when finally the original suggestion either prevails and makes the movement take place, or gets definitively quenched by its antagonists, we are said to decide… in favor of one or the other course. The reinforcing and inhibiting ideas meanwhile are termed the reasons or motives by which the decision is brought about.
William James (1890/1981)
41 - The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking Behavior
- from PART NINE - EXPERIENCED UTILITY AND OBJECTIVE HAPPINESS
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- By Itamar Simonson, Stanford University
- Edited by Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University, New Jersey, Amos Tversky, Stanford University, California
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- Book:
- Choices, Values, and Frames
- Published online:
- 01 February 2019
- Print publication:
- 25 September 2000, pp 735-757
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Summary
ABSTRACT. Two consumer strategies for the purchase of multiple items from a product class are contrasted. In one strategy (simultaneous choices/ sequential consumption), the consumer buys several items on one shopping trip and consumes the items over several consumption occasions. In the other strategy (sequential choices/sequential consumption), the consumer buys one item at a time, just before each consumption occasion. The first strategy is posited to yield more variety seeking than the second. The greater variety seeking is attributed to forces operating in the simultaneous choices/sequential consumption strategy, including uncertainty about future preferences and a desire to simplify the decision. Evidence from three studies, two involving real products and choices, is consistent with these conjectures. The implications and limitations of the results are discussed.
Consumption of products often is separated temporally from the decision to buy those products. Hence, when making a purchase decision, consumers must predict their preferences at the time of consumption (Kahneman and Snell, in press; March 1978). The decision is complicated further if consumers want to avoid going to the store before each consumption occasion and decide to buy several items in a category for a number of occasions. For example, in one shopping trip a consumer might purchase a week's supply of yogurt. The research reported here examines the strategies consumers use when making multiple purchases in a product category for future consumption. The behavior of consumers who make multiple purchases in a product class for several consumption occasions is compared with that of consumers who purchase one item at a time before each consumption occasion.